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This paper examines the impact of the U.S.-Mexico trade agreement under NAFTA. The 
results suggest that U.S. agricultural imports from Mexico have been responsive to tariff 
rate reductions applied to Mexican products. A 1 percent decrease in tariff rates is 
associated with an increase in U.S. agricultural imports from Mexico by 3.96 percent in 
the first six years of NAFTA and by 1.07 percent in the last six years of NAFTA. US 
imports from Mexico have also been attributable to the pre-NAFTA tariff rates. Overall, 
the results indicate that the U.S.-Mexico trade agreement under NAFTA has been trade 
creating rather than trade diverting.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The surge of free trade agreements (FTAs) has raised the question of their impact 
on the countries included in the FTA and on the rest of the world (Bhagwati and Krueger, 
1995; Krueger, 1997). It is an issue that economists have long debated. The debate has 
divided economists between those who oppose FTAs and those who support them.  The 
former group emphasizes trade-creating effects. By reducing (eliminating) trade barriers 
among members, FTA can improve resource allocation within a region and improve 
income for member countries. Production shifts toward the most efficient producers of 
specific commodities within the FTA and consumers are better off because they can 
purchase goods at lower prices. The latter group argues that FTAs are by definition 
discriminatory because they lower/eliminate barriers on internal trade while retaining 
barriers to trade with non-members and are, therefore, trade diverting. Even if an FTA 
results in internal trade creation, these proponents believe that such gains are likely to be 
outweighed by their trade diverting effects. In general, one would expect an FTA to result 
in some amount of both trade creation and trade diversion (Krueger, 1999; Venables, 
2000). If the trade diversion is sufficiently large relative to the trade creation, the 
agreement could conceivably end up being harmful to the member countries. 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is one of the most 
comprehensive agreements in history. Like many other FTAs, the creation of NAFTA has 
been a subject of bitter discussions and division among politicians and economists, 
focusing on the impact that NAFTA might have on the trade and economic welfare 
(Fukao, Okuba, Stern, 2002). When NAFTA was being negotiated in the early 1990s, for 
example, many countries voiced concern that their exports to the United States (and, to a   3 
lesser extent, to Canada and Mexico) would be displaced by NAFTA exports, even 
though in many products and industries those countries could be more competitive than 
NAFTA producers (Lederman et al., 2003). From the viewpoint of Mexico, this trade 
diversion is also important because it would entail a loss of fiscal revenues from 
replacing imports from third countries subject to tariffs with duty-free imports from the 
United States or Canada. 
Despite the growing concern of the debate, NAFTA was expected to create new 
trade among the member countries. Through progressive elimination of tariff and 
nontariff barriers, bilateral trade flows among the United States, Canada, and Mexico 
were expected to increase. A number of reports have shown evidence of increased trade 
flows. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), for example, analyzed that by 2001, 
NAFTA had increased U.S. exports to Mexico by 11.3 percent and had increased the U.S. 
import from Mexico by 7.7 percent (CBO, 2003). On the other part, the report also 
pointed out that the agreement had almost no effect on the U.S. trade balance with 
Mexico; and little effect on the change in U.S. GDP.  
Considerable concern is also expressed not about the increased trade among the 
NAFTA member countries, but rather about the welfare implications of that increase. 
Agriculture is one of the sectors in which there is considerable concern about the 
potential effects of free trade agreements on domestic producers and consumers 
(Miljkovic and Paul, 2003).  Prior to NAFTA implementation, for example, the impact of 
NAFTA on Mexican agriculture received a lot of rather pessimistic attention (Levy and 
van Wijnbergen, 1994).  Recently, it has also become the subject of political controversy   4 
as a consequence of the liberalization of certain sensitive products for Mexico, which was 
implemented in January 2003 (Lederman et al, 2003).  
OBJECTIVES 
Quantitative economic analysis of the potential effects of NAFTA has been done. 
However, few studies addressed whether new trade in the agricultural sector has been 
created at all. The objective of this study is to estimate and evaluate the benefits of 
NAFTA, emphasizing trade creation and trade diversion in the U.S.–Mexico agreements. 
This is particularly important because the liberalization of U.S.-Mexico trade is in an 
advanced stage; however, there are still many crucial trade disputes between the two 
countries such as in the case of sugar and High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) and notably, 
the concern on the impact that NAFTA might have on the trade and economic welfare.  
In order to evaluate the effects of NAFTA, US import demand functions from 
both Mexico and rest of the World (ROW) are analyzed [1]. There are certain aspects that 
make this study different from previous empirical work. First, this study focuses on the 
agricultural products within the 4-digit level of Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS). More 
importantly, this study utilizes commodities that were subject to the non-zero pre-
NAFTA tariff rates. For agricultural products, this is crucial because NAFTA 
immediately reduced tariffs to zero for most agricultural products traded between the 
United States and Mexico. Including the zero pre-NAFTA tariffs in the analysis would 
reduce the variations of tariff rates and give biased estimates.  
Second, the 12 years of NAFTA’s implementation has provided adequate 
historical data to assess NAFTA trade impacts. Because tariffs are gradually reduced or 
eliminated, their impacts are also believed to diminish gradually or decay over time. As   5 
such, the earlier years of NAFTA should experience higher impact on trade than the later 
period. This study proposes such measure by allowing the impacts of tariff reduction to 
differ during the NAFTA period. 
Third, this study also seeks to assess the differential impacts of pre-NAFTA 
tariffs (initial tariff rates) on the U.S. imports from Mexico. Clausing (2001) provided 
discussions on the variation in initial tariff rates that may affect trade flows.  He noted 
that because initial tariff rates were predetermined, they are useful for identifying the 
impact of tariff changes on trade flows. One could argue that NAFTA would have little or 
negligible impact on trade when pre-NAFTA tariffs were already low; and it would have 
bigger impacts for commodities having relatively higher pre-NAFTA tariff rates. By 
grouping the pre-NAFTA tariff rates and constructing dummy variables, this study is able 
to trace such impacts. 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
  Much empirical work has been devoted towards evaluating trade and welfare 
effects of FTAs. These studies have taken two main forms: computer simulation studies 
of the full general equilibrium effects of FTA membership and econometric studies of 
changes in trade flows (Venables, 2000; Burfisher et al., 2001). The ex-ante studies with 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models utilize various simulation methods to 
analyze a calibrated model economy for a particular base year. Virtually, most of the 
studies analyzing the impacts of FTA on member countries as well as nonmembers have 
used a CGE model and find that trade agreements have been welfare improving, i.e. trade 
creation outweighed trade diversion (Kehoe and Kehoe, 1994; Krueger, 2000; Burfisher 
et al., 2001).  For the case of NAFTA, all the model agree that NAFTA would provide   6 
positive gains to member countries with Mexico would enjoy the biggest gains and the 
U.S. would experience marginal increase in the economy. Canada would expect only 
minimal effects.    
  CGE-based FTA studies are not without criticism, however. Kehoe (2003), for 
example, argues that CGE models greatly underestimate the increases in trade resulting 
from NAFTA. The CGE model is also considered to lack detailed, up-to-date policy 
coverage and product disaggregation (Beghin and Aksoy, 2003). In response to these 
criticisms, researchers have used econometric methods with historical time series (and 
cross sectional) data to analyze the effects of FTAs on trade flows and welfare. This 
approach seeks to quantify the changes in trade flows attributable to membership in a 
FTA, and thereby identify trade creation and trade diversion. The most common approach 
is the gravity model, which regresses trade flows among trading partners on their 
respective economic size (i.e. GDP) and geographic distance as proxy for transportation 
costs. Dummy variables are typically used to capture the impact of various preferential 
trading agreements on trade flows. Some examples are studies given by Gould (1998), 
Krueger (1999), Zahniser et al. (2002), and Lederman et al.  (2003). In general these 
studies agree that NAFTA was not a trade diverting agreement. 
  Similar to the CGE model, there are problems with the gravity approach. Clausing 
(2001) provided three points of weaknesses with regard to the gravity equation model. 
First, the use of dummy variables is considered to be inadequate in capturing the effects 
of preferential trade liberalization. Second, the gravity model does not indicate the extent 
of trade creation and trade diversion; hence it is difficult to assess the net effects of the 
agreements. The third problem is associated with the data used in the analyses. In most   7 
cases, the studies utilized a very aggregate level such that it is difficult to exploit 
variations in the extent of trade liberalization across goods or industries (Clausing, 2001; 
p.680). 
An extension of the gravity approach has been used to assess the impact of FTAs 
on  trade  and  welfare.  Unlike  the  gravity  model  that  takes  the  model  as  an  “ad  hoc” 
representation, the current approach is developed based on a better-grounded economic 
theory such as demand theory. The work of Karemera and Koo (1994), Clausing (2000), 
and Fukao et al. (2002) are some examples. Karemera and Koo analyze the trade effects 
of removing tariff and nontariff barriers between the U.S.-Canadian free trade agreements 
using quarterly data from 1970 to 1987. They applied seemingly unrelated regression 
estimation  (SUR)  technique  to  estimate  the  demand  functions  based  on  the  SITC 
classification (the United States) and SIC classification (Canada). They conclude that 
U.S. imports of Canadian goods were more sensitive to domestic and bilateral import 
prices than were Canadian Imports of U.S. goods. They also find that tariff and nontariff 
elimination  would  increase  bilateral  trade  volume  across  all  commodities  traded, 
primarily trough trade creation and trade diversion.  
Clausing (2001) was first to exploit tariff variation at the detailed commodity 
level using US import data from 1989 to 1994. He finds that tariff liberalization was 
responsible for the growth in US imports and there was little evidence of trade creation. 
Fukao, Okubo and Stern (2002) analyze US imports at the HS 2-digit level and 4-digit 
level for the period 1992-1998. They find that NAFTA tariff preferences had a significant 
effect on US imports in 15 cases. Their results also show that there was evidence of trade 
diversion especially in U.S. imports of textiles and apparel products from Mexico.    8 
Another  similar  approach  that  uses  tariff  data  to  examine  trade  effects  is 
McDaniel and Agama (2003) who estimate the effects of NAFTA on U.S. import demand 
for Mexican goods and Mexico’s demand for U.S. exports. The results suggest that U.S. 
import demand for Mexican goods is responsive to tariff preferences, especially during 
the NAFTA years. Similarly, they find that Mexico’s demand for U.S. exports was also 
responsive to the NAFTA preference. 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
Empirical Specification 
To evaluate the effects of NAFTA on the trade flows between the United States 
and Mexico, we construct import demand functions for the United States from Mexico as 
well as from the rest of the world (ROW). The import demand specification of the U.S. 
agricultural products from Mexico takes the form: 
(1) 
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it Q is the dollar volume of U.S. imports from Mexico for 4-digit HTS level at 
time period t, 
US
t Y is the U.S. personal consumption expenditures (PCE) at time period t, 
and 
MEX
it TR is the tariff rates against exporting country (Mexico) for 4-digit HTS level at 
period t. In order to take into account the lagged impact of tariff rates, we use lagged one 
period tariff rates. Economic theory suggests that PCE will have positive impact on the 
US imports from Mexico and conversely, tariff rates (
MEX
it TR ) should have negative 
impact, i.e. a decrease in 
MEX
it TR will induce more US imports from Mexico. DNAFTA is 
a dummy variable for NAFTA which takes the value of one during the NAFTA period   9 
and zero otherwise. DNAFTA may not only measure the effect of NAFTA but may also 
represent other events that are not accounted in the model.  it u is the random disturbance 
term. We will discuss the properties of  it u in the estimation procedures. 
  NAFTA agreements provided that tariff rates should be gradually reduced. Tariff 
rates for most agricultural products were immediately eliminated as NAFTA was 
implemented, while some remaining tariffs will have been phased out in 10 to 15 years. It 
is believed that the effect of tariff reductions differ during the NAFTA period. Notably, 
the earlier reductions would be expected to have greater impacts. The impacts would 
diminish or decay as the tariff rates became closer to the phasing out period. To test this 
conjecture, we include it TRDN , which is the multiplicative effects of tariff rates and 
NAFTA dummy variable. This specification will allow the effect of tariff reductions to 
differ during the NAFTA period. We break up this effect into two different periods: the 
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The above specification suggests that the effect of tariff rates can be observed based on 
the following equation: 
(3)  t t TRDN TRDN 2 5 1 4 2 a a a a + + =  
DT is a dummy variable for pre-NAFTA tariff rates. Analysts argue that the effect 
of NAFTA is very small or may be negligible when the tariff levels prior to NAFTA were 
already low.  DT is included to test whether different pre-NAFTA tariff rates have 
different impacts on US import demand from Mexico. In order to conduct this analysis,   10 
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Because tariff differentials among commodity groups are usually small, we do not 
include tariff rates from 10 percent to 20 percent. We expect to have negative signs for 
these dummy variables.  
The import demand for the U.S. agricultural products from ROW is constructed to 
measure the trade diversion that might occur during the implementation of NAFTA.  The 
independent variables consist of the tariff rates set by the U.S. against ROW (
ROW
it TR ), 
tariff rates against Mexico (
MEX
it TR ), DNAFTA, and quarterly dummy variables. In terms 
of economic theory, an increase in
ROW
it TR  is expected to negatively affect the US imports 
from ROW.  Conversely, an increase in
MEX
it TR is expected to positively affect the US 
imports from ROW. The central issue is overall on the coefficient of 
MEX
it TR . If in fact 
trade diversion occurs, then 
MEX
it TR must have a positive sign, meaning that a decrease in 
tariff rates against Mexico would reduce U.S. imports from ROW. With respect to 
DNAFTA, this variable may have a positive or negative sign. However, we expect that 
DNAFTA will have a positive impact because this variable captures not only NAFTA per 
se but also other events not included in the model.    11 
Following the above discussion, the US import demand from Row is written as  
 (5) 









u DQ DQ DQ
Y DNAFTA TR TR Q
+ + + +
+ + + + + + =
3 7 2 6 1 5
4 3 2 1 0 ) 1 ln( ) 1 ln( ln
b b b





it Q is the dollar volume of U.S. imports from ROW of the 4-digit HTS level at 
period t,  ) 3 , 2 , 1 ( = i DQit is quarterly dummy variable and other variables are as defined 
previously.  
Estimation 
Our empirical assessment of the specified equations is based on the panel data 
analysis. Within this framework, we are able to explore possible explanations for the 
heterogeneity in commodity groups or commodity characteristics. Potential reasons for 
the heterogeneity include different responses of import demand due to expected 
reductions in tariff rates, i.e. tariff schedules under NAFTA agreements and unobservable 
individual specific characteristics. 
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Where N is the number of cross sections, T is the length of time series for each cross 
section, and K is the number of independent variables. The central feature of panel data 
analysis is the structure of error components  . it u   The error components,  it u , can take 
different structures. The specification of error components can depend solely on the cross 
section to which the observation belongs or on both the cross section and time series. If 
the specification depends on the cross section, then we have  it i it v u e + = ; and if the   12 
specification is assumed to be dependent on both cross section and time series, the error 
components follow  it t i it e v u e + + = . The term  i v is intended to capture the heterogeneity 
across individuals, and the term  t e is intended to represent the heterogeneity over time. In 
this study, we assume that the error components follow the former specification. 
Furthermore,  i v and  t e  can either be random or nonrandom, and  it e is the classical 
error term with zero mean and homoscedastic covariance matrix. The nature of the error 
structures leads to different estimation procedures depending on the specification. Since 
our tests (Hausman’s tests for random effects) show that the fixed effects model is 
preferred to random effects model, our reports are only based on the fixed effects 
specification. Because of the presence of autocorrelation, the specified models are 
estimated under first order autocorrelation. 
DATA 
 
  According to the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) all of the products 
found in Chapters1-24, with the exception for fishery products in Chapters 3 and 16, are 
considered agricultural products. Certain other products outside of Chapters 1-24 are also 
considered agricultural products, particularly essential oils (Chapter 33), raw rubber 
(Chapter 40), raw animal hides and skins (Chapter 41), and wool and cotton (Chapters 
51-52). We adopt this classification for the definition of agricultural sector. The data 
consist of 4-digit HTS system and range from 1989 to 2005 in a quarterly basis. Because 
most agricultural products traded between the US and Mexico were already subject to 
free trade before NAFTA was in effect (i.e., zero tariff rates), we did not use all the 4-
digit level classified under agricultural products. Instead we selected commodity groups 
in which they were subject to non-zero tariff rates prior to the implementation of   13 
NAFTA. Besides, our selection of the commodity groups was also based on the 
consistency of the data during the selected period. The main reason for using the non-
zero tariff rates is to obtain variation in the tariff rates so that it helps identifying the 
effects of tariff liberalization. 
  The value of US imports from Mexico is used to represent the quantity of import 
and applied US tariff is based on detailed data on import duties collected. The tariff rates 
for each commodity classification are calculated as the ratio of calculated duties to 
customs value. The drawback of this approach is that tariff rates can only be observed 
when there is trade (Romalis, 2004). When there is no trade, we estimate the tariff rates 
by taking the average of two surrounding available tariffs. This is possible because only 
minor percentage of our data with showing no trade. The customs value and calculated 
duties are extracted from USITC (United State International Trade Commission) data 
base. Data on personal consumption expenditures of the US are used to represent income. 
The data are from Bureau of Economic Analysis data base and converted into real values 
using consumer price indices published by Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
RESULTS 
 
US Imports from Mexico 
 
Table 1 presents the econometric results for US import demand from Mexico.  
Specification (1) shows the effects of tariff rates on US imports by controlling NAFTA 
and allowing the effects to differ during the NAFTA period. Specification (2) reports the 
effect of tariff rates without controlling NAFTA. In general, most of the estimated 
coefficients are significant and posses the expected signs. The F statistics for testing the   14 
joint significance of the individual (group commodity) effects strongly suggest the 
presence of an individual heterogeneity in the data.   
Before turning to the detail discussion of the tariff and its impact on the US 
imports from Mexico, we will give a quick evaluation on the income variable. As shown 
in Table 1, the coefficients of income (PCE) are found to be significant in each 
specification with values of 1.1 and 1.2 for specification (1) and specification (2), 
respectively. These suggest that US agricultural imports from Mexico are responsive to 
income level with elasticity of 1.1 [3].  
Specification (1) shows the impacts of tariff rates reduction on US imports from 
Mexico. As shown in Table 1, the coefficient of tariff rates is negative and significant. 
Controlling NAFTA and income, the estimated parameter shows that a 1 percent decrease 
in the tariff rates against Mexico would increase US imports of agricultural products by 
1.7 percent. Note that this estimate indicates the impact of tariff rates during the whole 
period of the study. When considering the multiplicative effects, the sum of   2 a and 
4 a indicates the effects of tariff rates reductions for the period of 1994 through 1999 and 
the sum of  2 a and 5 a shows the effects of tariff reductions for the period of 2000 to 2005. 
The effects of tariff rates during the 12 years of NAFTA is represented by the sum of  2 a , 
4 a , and  5 a . As can be seen, the coefficient of  4 a is significant and negative as expected.  
This means that the effects of tariff reductions during the first 6 years has been 3.96% 
increase of every 1 percent decrease in tariff rates against Mexico. 
The coefficient of  5 a is positive and less than one but not significant. The 
relatively low parameter estimate is as expected due to the declining effects of tariff 
reductions. The insignificant parameter may be justified by the fact that some of the   15 
commodities have been subject to trade liberalization (zero tariff rates) or at least have 
been in the period of low tariff level. Hence, any reduction of tariff levels in this period 
may not significantly affect the US imports from Mexico, as indeed shown in this study. 
Regardless of significance level, the effects of tariff reductions on US imports from 
Mexico have been an increase of 1.07% during the last 6 years of NAFTA and 3.37% 
during the NAFTA period. By estimating the model without NAFTA dummy variable 
and its associated multiplicative effects, we also found a similar magnitude of the effects 
of tariff reductions. As shown in specification (2), the coefficient of  2 a is negative and 
significant with its magnitude of -3.73%. This indicates that a 1 percent reduction in tariff 
rates has increased the US imports from Mexico by 3.73%.  
Other important results are also given in Table 1. Researchers argue that the 
effects of NAFTA may be subject to the tariff levels prior to NAFTA implementation. 
Our specification enables us to track such effect in that it can show the different impact of 
tariff levels prior to NAFTA.  The coefficients of  6 a and 7 a in the two specifications 
clearly show that the lower the pre-NAFTA tariff rates, the lower is the impact on the 
increase of US imports from Mexico as tariff rates are reduced. From specification (1), 
US agricultural imports from Mexico during the NAFTA period was approximately 34% 
higher than pre NAFTA for group commodities with pre-NAFTA tariff rates less than 
10%. On the other hand, this figure was 63% for commodities that fall into the category 
of pre-NAFTA tariff rates greater than 20%. 
Finally, the effect of DNAFTA on US agricultural imports from Mexico has been 
significant. US imports from Mexico during NAFTA were 68.8% higher than the entire 
period of analysis. However, one should note that these coefficients can not explain the   16 
effect of NAFTA per se because this variable captures not only NAFTA but also other 
events that are not accounted in the model. 
US Imports from ROW 
 
  One way to investigate the presence of trade diversion can be done by regressing 
US imports from ROW on tariff rates set by the US against Mexico. A positive sign of 
this variable indicates that trade diversion exists. Table 2 reports the econometric results 
for US import demand from ROW. Specification (1) shows estimation results for US 
import demand from ROW with tariff rates against Mexico that is intended to see 
whether trade diversion occurred while controlling for NAFTA. It also provides estimates 
of NAFTA dummy variable to test whether US imports from ROW increased during the 
NAFTA period. These two variables can be jointly used to justify whether trade diversion 
indeed occurred. Similarly, specification (2) gives estimates of the effects of both tariff 
rates against ROW and tariff rates against Mexico on US imports from ROW without 
controlling for NAFTA.  
Except for tariff rates against Mexico and NAFTA dummy variable, all 
coefficients are significant at reasonable levels. They also posses expected signs. The 
coefficient of determination is 0.76 and the F-statistics for fixed effects tests show the 
presence of heterogeneity in commodity characteristics. The seasonal dummy variables 
show significant differences in US imports from ROW from quarter to quarter. In all 
cases, the US imports from ROW in the fourth quarter are higher than the first three 
quarters.  
The US agricultural import demand from ROW seems to be income elastic with 
its magnitudes are 2.1 and 2.3 based on specification (1) and (2), respectively.  It is   17 
surprising that the NAFTA dummy variable is not significant at any reasonable level 
even though it has the expected sign. If it were significant we could have expected that 
US agricultural imports from ROW in the first 12 years of NAFTA were 10.5% higher 
than they would have been without NAFTA. Strong income effects in the United States 
likely negate this result. 
The estimated results for the coefficients of tariff rates against ROW suggest that 
a 1% reduction in tariff rates against ROW is associated with 1.5% increase in US 
agricultural imports from ROW.  This is clearly less than half of the effects of tariff 
reductions against Mexico on US agricultural imports from Mexico. This evidence 
suggests that the United States gives more preference to Mexican agricultural products 
than ROW agricultural products. This is not surprising given the fact that the United 
States and Mexico are tied to the NAFTA agreements along with other advantages such 
as geographical proximity.   The parameter estimates of tariff rates against Mexico are 
positive. As previously stated, a positive sign of tariff rates indicates the presence of trade 
diversion. However, since these coefficients are not significant, we would argue that 
there is no significance evidence that NAFTA has caused trade diversion in agricultural 
sector, particularly those as a result of the United States and Mexico trade agreements.  
 
Trade creation and Trade Diversion 
 
  As previously discussed, the net benefit of  FTA as a whole derives from the 
portion of the new trade among the member countries (trade creation) and each particular 
portion of the new trade among the member countries which is a substitute for trade with 
nonmembers (trade diversion).  The regression results show that tariff reductions during 
the NAFTA period had significant effects on US imports from Mexico, while the   18 
coefficient of tariff rates against Mexico regressed on US imports from ROW was not 
significant, even though it has a positive sign. Before concluding that NAFTA has 
impacted trade flows, it would be informative to highlight the changes in US imports 
from NAFTA countries and ROW. 
Figure 1 shows the shares of US imports of the selected 4-digit level HTS from 
Canada, Mexico, and ROW from 1989 to 2005.  As the figure shows, there was an 
immediate sharp increase of US imports from Mexico after NAFTA’s inception, before 
experiencing a slight decrease in 1996 and 1997. The share of US imports from Canada 
increased gradually with a slight decrease in 2003. The share of US imports from Mexico 
increased from 21% to 29% between 1989 and 2005. During the same period the share of 
US imports from Canada increased from 11.6% to 21%. In general we can conclude that 
there has been an upward trend in the share of US imports from both Mexico and Canada 
during the NAFTA period; and suggesting that NAFTA has been trade creating. 
Meanwhile, the share of US imports from ROW has degraded continually since 1989. 
Notably, US imports from ROW declined from 67.1% in 1989 to 50% in 2005.  
The increase in the share of US imports from Mexico and Canada accompanied 
by a decrease in the share of US imports from ROW has raised the question whether the 
US shifted away its imports from ROW to the NAFTA members. It is very important to 
response to such concern because if in fact the US did shift its imports at the expense of 
ROW, there was clearly trade diversion. Figure 2 may clarify the issue. As depicted in 
this figure, US agricultural imports from Mexico, Canada, and ROW increased 
substantially from year to year with a slight decline in particular years. In general, the 
trend of US imports from NAFTA members and ROW suggest that the US did not shift   19 
away its imports from ROW.  The decline in the share of US imports from ROW was 
particularly due to the fact that US imports from NAFTA members grew faster than those 
from ROW. 
  Historical data show that there is evidence that US agricultural imports from 
Mexico have increased since the inception of NAFTA. But to what degree the increase is 
attributable to NAFTA is difficult to examine. Other important factors have also been 
responsible for the increase. Krueger (1999, 2000), for example, noted that the economic 
growth and the change in exchange rates were responsible for the growth in trade flows 
in the NAFTA region. However, while such other factors are of full consideration, we 
argue that NAFTA has been trade creating.  Our conclusion is also supported by 
regression results. As shown in Table 1 and the discussions that follow, tariff rate 
reduction has had a positive impact on US imports from Mexico. This impact is even 
higher during the NAFTA period compared to the average of entire period. The other 
regression results in Table 2 clearly indicate that reductions in tariff rates against Mexico 
did not significantly lower US imports from ROW, suggesting that trade diversion did not 
occur to a significant degree. 
  If however, one still believed that trade diversion existed as the sign of 
MEX
it TR in 
equation (5) was positive, we still argue that NAFTA has been net trade creating. This is 
because the absolute magnitude of the coefficient 
MEX
it TR in equation (5) is far below the 
coefficient that measures the impacts of 
MEX
it TR on US imports from Mexico.  
CONCLUSIONS 
  This paper has estimated US agricultural import demand functions from both 
Mexico and ROW and examined the trade creation and trade diversion that may have   20 
occurred in the US-Mexico agreements under NAFTA using panel data of 35 selected 4-
digit level of Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) from 1989-2005. The 35 commodity 
groups were selected on the basis of tariff rates that were not subject to zero tariff rates 
prior to NAFTA. The use of more disaggregated data and the non-zero pre NAFTA tariff 
rates has enabled us to examine the variations of tariff rates and also reduce bias that 
might have occurred if we included the zero pre NAFTA tariff rates in the analysis.   
  The results suggest that US agricultural imports from Mexico have been 
responsive to tariff rate reductions applied to Mexican products.  A 1 percent reduction in 
tariff would increase US agricultural imports from Mexico by 1.7% in the entire period. 
Results also show that during NAFTA, a 1 percent decrease in tariff rates would increase 
US agricultural imports from Mexico by 3.96 percent in the first six years of NAFTA and 
by 1.07 percent in the last six years of NAFTA. Overall impact would be 3.34 percent 
increase in US imports from Mexico for a 1 percent decrease in tariff rates. The US 
imports from Mexico have also been attributable to the pre NAFTA tariff rates. Higher 
pre NAFTA tariff levels would result in a higher percentage increase in US agricultural 
imports from Mexico as tariff rates are reduced. Similarly, US imports from ROW have 
also significantly been affected by tariff rates applied to ROW. The effect, however, is 
lower compared to Mexico. We also found that US agricultural imports from Mexico 
during NAFTA were approximately 53 percent higher than the entire period. Conversely, 
there is no ample evidence for such case in US imports from ROW.   
  Overall we conclude that there is significant evidence that the US-Mexico 
trade agreement under NAFTA has been trade creating rather than trade diverting.  This 
finding is especially important given arguments by Caribbean and other countries that   21 
U.S.-Mexico trade has diverted commercial sales. The extent to which these results may 
be applicable to other agreements, such as Central America – Dominican Republic, is 
limited since each case must be empirically verified. 
   22 
Footnotes 
[1] Initially, we planned to estimate import demand for Mexico from the United States. 
However, due to data availability, especially the tariff rates for agricultural products set 
by Mexican Government for US agricultural products and the rest of the world, this 
analysis was not done. If such data were available, we would have been able to assess the 
bilateral trade in a more complete setting. Because of such constraints, we focus on US 
imports of selected agricultural products. 
 [2] It is possible to define yearly dummy variable to see the year to year effect. However, 
this may cause severe collinearity problem. Besides, observing tariff effects in the early 
years may also be difficult. Therefore, by defining two regimes in the first 12 years of 
NAFTA is a reasonable one. 
[3] Because all variables, except for dummy variables, are in log values, the parameter 
estimates show the elasticity, showing the percentage change in the dependent variable 
associated  with  a  1  percent  change  in  the  corresponding  independent  variable.  Our 
interpretation of the coefficient of dummy variables is based on suggestions by Kennedy 
(1981). Suppose that c ˆis the estimate of a dummy variable coefficient c, its effect on the 
dependent variable (which is in log value) is given by  1 )) ˆ ( ˆ exp( 2
1 * - - = c v c g , where 
) ˆ (c v is  an  estimate  of  the  variance  c ˆ.  See  also  Halvorsen  and  Palmquist  (1980)  for 
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Table 1. Effects of Tariff Rates and NAFTA on US Imports from Mexico 
 
  Specification 1  Specification 2 
 
Tariff Rates Mexico,  2 a                    -1.691(0.818)
**  -3.733(0.742)
*** 
DNAFTA,  3 a    0.528(0.093)
***           - 
Tariff Rates x DNAFTA1
a,  4 a          -2.268(1.357)
*                             - 
Tariff Rates x DNAFTA2
a,  5 a   0.621(1.709)           - 
Tariff Dummy 1,  6 a                          -0.286(0.121)
**  -0.161(0.118) 
Tariff Dummy 2,  7 a                          -0.477(0.159)
***  -0.529(0.159)
*** 
Personal Consumption Exp.,  1 a   1.122(0.026)
***   1.167(0.025)
*** 




2   0.58   0.58 
F Statistics for Fixed       
       Effects Test  69.76   67.27 
Number of Time Series  66   66 
Number of Cross Sections  35   35 
Total observations  2310   2310 
 
Numbers in parentheses are estimated standard errors. 
*, 
**, and 
*** are significant at 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively. 
aTariff Rates Mexico x NAFTA Dummy as a means of measuring multiplicative effects, 
allowing tariff rates effect to differ during NAFTA period (see definition in the empirical 
model specification).   28 
Table 2. Effects of Tariff Rates and NAFTA on US Imports from ROW 
 
  Specification 1  Specification 2 
 
Tariff Rates ROW,  1 b                        -1.541(0.764)
**  -1.594(0.763)
** 
Tariff Rates Mexico,  2 b                       0.897(0.583)   0.799(0.576) 
DNAFTA,  3 b    0.104(0.093)           - 
Personal Consumption Exp.,  4 b    2.061(0.093)
***   2.315(0.218)
*** 
Dummy Quarter 1,  5 b   -2.767(0.917)
***  -3.493(0.653)
*** 
Dummy Quarter 2,  6 b   -1.274(0.369)
***  -1.564(0.265)
*** 
Dummy Quarter 3,  7 b   -0.687(0.121)
***  -0.778(0.090)
*** 




2   0.76   0.76 
F Statistics for Fixed       
       Effects Test   176.97   176.82 
Number of Time Series
a   66   66 
Number of Cross Sections   35   35 
Total observations   2310   2310 
 
Numbers in parentheses are estimated standard errors. 
** and 
*** are significant at 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
aAfter adjusting first order autocorrelation.   29 
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